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1ABSTRACT
It is increasingly becoming apparent to domestic and international investors that the European
Central Bank’s bond buying programme which commenced in May 2010, “a way of
correcting market dislocations that were hampering the central bank’s conduct of monetary
policy”, and its provision of much cheaper Longer Term Refinancing Operations (LTROs),
constitute more of temporary, expected continuous measures aimed at addressing the Euro
zone’s sovereign debt problems (through fostering demand for sovereign debt and damping
increases in yields).
This paper is aimed at evaluating means whereby a redress of the Euro zone’s sovereign debt
problems could be effectively achieved. In addition to present regulatory efforts and
regulatory measures, it also considers other measures - one of which aims to combine
“quantitative easing” schemes with other policies which would effectively address the need to
reduce the debt burden of countries such as Greece, Portugal, Spain, Ireland and Italy, whilst
incorporating corrective measures which lead to a growth in economic activities as well as
increased competitiveness. The emphasis on tough fiscal measures - rather than the need for
more stringent regulatory financial reforms is also considered to have played a contributory
role – not only in the difficulty encountered by heavily indebted countries in reducing their
levels of sovereign debts, but also creating further debts .
Key Words: bond swaps; Greek debt crisis, sovereign debt restructuring; bailouts; Securities
Markets Programme; bond yields; domestic bondholders; fiscal, monetary policies; Basel III;
Capital standards; Liquidity Standards; macro prudential policy tools; Over-the-Counter
(OTC) derivatives; Credit-Default-Swaps (CDS); disclosure; bank; regulation; leverage ratios
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A. Introduction: The Real Cause of the Recent Financial Crises
The agreement resulting from the European Union Summit in Brussels in December 2011, is
not only considered to have generated many headlines – particularly in relation to the disunity
resulted from its conclusion, but also considered to have produced a “cure” which is regarded
as an inappropriate response to the present challenges being encountered in the Euro zone.
According to Skidelsky, the agreement:
- Forecloses any possibility of Keynesian demand management to fight recession.
Structural budget deficits are to be limited to 0.5% of GDP, with (as yet undisclosed)
penalties for violators. This is the wrong cure for the euro zone crisis...... It was not
deficit spending by governments that fuelled the economic collapse of 2007-2008, but
excessive lending by banks. Government’s mounting debts have been a response to
the economic downturn, not its cause. What ought to have been hard wired into the
EU’s institutional structure was not permanent fiscal austerity, but tough financial
regulation. Of this there is little sign.”1
Whilst Skidelsky’s argument (that tougher regulatory measures are required rather than
penalising and permanent fiscal measures), cannot be denied, the contention that there is little
1 See R Skidelsky, “The Euro In a Shrinking Zone” Business Day, 19 December 2011
<www.businessdayonline.com>
3evidence of financial regulatory efforts is more contentious. However, his argument in
relation to the need to incorporate the “Keynesian demand management to fight recession” is
a valid one which will need to be implemented if a more permanent means of addressing the
present Euro zone crisis is to be achieved. For this as well as other reasons, two factors which
are considered crucial by the author in addressing the present sovereign debt crisis embrace
financial regulatory measures as well as the implementation of fiscal measures which are
such that whilst they generate corrective effects, they do not impede2 the prospects of growth
and development for the economy.
During the recent Financial Crisis, as well as the 2010 and ongoing European Sovereign Debt
Crisis, several governments had/have had to raise their debt levels in order to stabilize their
economies. The principal problem attributed to sovereign debts, which is linked to their
characteristics, is the possibility of defaults occurring in relation to these – since they are
usually accompanied without collaterals. The possibilities of such defaults occurring are
further increased where bailouts are granted in relation to these debts. Increased doubts in
relation to the likelihood of larger sovereigns “rolling over maturing debt on their own”, as
well as the consequential occurrence of “very high, economically penalizing, interest rates”,
is considered to be the present reality.
Even though it is argued that the most recent Financial Crisis was a capital crisis - not a
liquidity crisis, events such as the failure of Northern Rock, as well as problems encountered
by major banks which were considered to have been complying with Basel Capital
2 “When an economy shrinks, government debt grows automatically, because its revenues decline and its
expenses rise. When it cuts spending, it debt levels rise even further because cuts in spending lead to further
shrinking of the economy. This makes the government more susceptible to defaults.” See ibid
4requirements, are plausible indicators of the fact that the recent Financial Crisis was triggered
by pro cyclical, as well as liquidity related issues such as maturity transformations. The focus
accorded by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision to capital requirements - as
opposed to liquidity standards, also provided further justification for evidence which
corroborates a lack of sufficient focus on matters and factors which contribute in triggering a
liquidity, and ultimately, banking crises.
Whilst it is widely agreed and not disputed that capital and liquidity requirements both
contributed to the most recent Financial Crisis, the extent to which Basel III addresses
major/fundamental questions arising from the Crisis, provides further grounds for further
debates. This paper considers those fundamental issues which have arisen in light of the
recent Crisis against the background of efforts which have been made by the Basel
Committee to consolidate capital, liquidity standards – as well as macro prudential policy
tools. As well as highlighting the increased focus accorded by the Basel Committee to the
macro prudential level, the paper will consider macro prudential policies which have been
introduced to address system wide risks.
The first four sections of this paper (subsequent to the introductory section) will consider
improvements which have been introduced through Basel III in respect of prudential
supervisory tools. To facilitate this aim, these sections will consider capital, liquidity and
macro prudential supervisory tools which currently exist or are about to be introduced. In
emphasizing the need for greater focus on macro prudential policies – which ultimately
facilitate a more system-wide market based approach to regulation, sections two to five
illustrate how Basel III’s more macro prudential focus should help facilitate the monitoring of
5vital and useful information such as market wide data on asset prices and liquidity. The need
for such monitoring being of vital importance since derivative markets, (and the Over the-
Counter (O-T-C) derivatives market in particular – being the largest3 market for derivatives),
are largely unregulated with respect to the disclosure of information between parties.
Hence the sixth section of the paper will consider the importance of information gaps –
particularly within OTC markets, as well as steps taken by the Basel Committee to address
these. The second half of this paper seeks to address some other important aspects, namely:
i) The need to introduce measures which are aimed at facilitating greater disclosure
in respect of complex instruments which banks are exposed to during the course
of their daily transactions. One of such complex instruments being the OTC
derivatives markets – whereby many major banks are exposed to huge losses.
A second means whereby many major banks could be exposed to huge losses is attributed to
sovereign debt exposures. “Many European banks are thought to have large holdings of
sovereign debt from the “peripheral” countries that have not been marked-to-market, and thus
represent sizeable potential losses for the banks when the sovereign debt is ultimately
restructured.” 4 In fact, the highest proportions of government debt within the Euro zone is
3 The “OTC derivative market is the largest market for derivatives. According to the Bank for International
Settlements, the total outstanding notional amount is US $684 trillion (as of June 2008). Of this notional
amount, 67% comprise interest rate contracts; 8% credit default swaps (CDS); 9% foreign exchange contracts;
2% commodity contracts; 1% equity contracts; and 12% other.
Because OTC derivatives are not traded on an exchange, there is no central counter party and they are therefore
subject to counter party risk – like an ordinary contract (since each counterparty relies on the other to perform).”
See Financial Stability Board, “Implementing OTC Derivatives Market Reforms” 25th October 2010
<http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_101025.pdf> and also
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Derivative_(finance)#OTC_and_exchange_traded>
4 “The ECB and the European central banks”, it is further argued, “need to identify those banks that are
impaired by excessive sovereign holdings and assist them in recapitalization – however, also pushing the larger,
stronger banks to accept exchange offers in the interest of bank transparency and restructuring as well as in
6held by private banks. As a result, the sovereign crisis will also transform to a banking crisis
in the event of defaults – given the level of exposures.
At the present the European Central Bank is doing its best to sustain demand for sovereign
debts. In the past two years, it has purchased bonds from euro zone governments in a bid to
sustain demand for these debts, as well as lowering their yields. However the efficiency and
effectiveness of the purchase of such bonds is being questioned – particularly owing to the
fact that it is widely agreed that the recovery of competitiveness within the euro zone is
required. Of greater concern, is the feedback effect generated by Longer Term Refinancing
Operations (LTROs) in providing an avenue for banks to invest such cheaper loans (obtained
at 1%) from the European Central Bank, in lucrative and financially rewarding investments.
Sovereign debt exposures, the effects of bail outs resulting from sovereign debts and Longer
Term Refinancing Operations (LTROs), ways whereby the new Basel liquidity standards
could help address sovereign debt problems (as well as other measures which have been
proposed), the European Central Bank’s recent efforts in its bond purchasing ventures,
measures which could be adopted to address the sovereign debt crisis (whilst fostering
economic development), as well as developments in what is considered to be “Western
Europe’s first sovereign debt restructuring in decades” will constitute the focus of discussion
in relation to the remaining sections of this paper.
Of greater concern than the European Central Bank’s bond buying programme, is the
feedback effect generated by Longer Term Refinancing Operations in providing an avenue for
resolving the sovereign debt problem.” See N Economides and RC Smith, “Trichet Bonds To Resolve the
European Sovereign Debt Problem” January 2011 at pages 2 and 3 <http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=1836743>
7banks to invest such cheaper loans (obtained at 1%) from the European Central Bank, in
lucrative and financially rewarding investments. Such investments sometimes assuming the
form of the purchase of far higher yielding domestic government debt. It appears that several
of these banks are already of the opinion that there will be sovereign defaults on the part of
governments anytime and anyway in the near future and that they might as well recoup some
profits at the earliest possible time – should sovereign defaults eventually occur.
ii) The sovereign debt problem leads us to another important aspect, the importance
of timely implementation of additional leverage ratios which have recently been
introduced by the Basel Committee. If the two new liquidity standards, the
Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR), and the Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR), are
introduced without coupling these to the additional new leverage ratios, this could
lead to a concentration of banks’ funds – which could subsequently be vulnerable
to sovereign exposures.
Basel III is considered to be “fundamentally different” from Basel I and II as a result of its
combination of “micro and macro prudential reforms to address both institution and system
level risks.”5
Basel III = Enhanced Basel II + Macro prudential Outlay6
5 With respect to micro prudential aspects, Basel III reforms indicate i) “Significant increase in risk coverage
– with focus on areas that were most problematic during the Crisis (for example, trading book exposures,
counterparty credit risk, and securitization activities); ii) fundamental tightening of the definition of capital – as
well as a strong focus on common equity (introduction of requirements that all capital instruments must absorb
losses at the point of non-viability – which was not the case during the most recent Financial Crisis); iii)
Introduction of a leverage ratio which should serve as a backstop to the risk based framework; iv) the
introduction of global liquidity standards to address short-term and long term liquidity mismatches; and v)
Enhancements to Pillar 2’s supervisory review process and Pillar 3’s market discipline – particularly for trading
and securitization activities.” S Walter, “Basel III: Stronger Banks and a More Resilient Financial System”
http://www.bis.org/speeches/sp110406.pdf at page 3 of 12
8Enhanced Basel II = Micro prudential Framework (aimed at “increasing quantity as well as
improving quality of capital, adequate capital charges needed in the trading book, enhancing
risk management and disclosure, introducing a leverage ratio to supplement risk weighted
measures, addressing counter party risk posed by Over-the Counter (OTC) derivatives.”)
Macro Prudential Outlay:
This aspect addresses:
i) ”stability over time” (pro cyclicality) through:
- Counter cyclical capital charges and forward looking provisioning
- Capital conservation rules for stronger capital buffers
ii) As well as “stability at each point in time” (system wide approach):
- Systemic capital surcharge for systemically important financial institutions
- Identify inter linkages and common exposures among all financial institutions
- Systemic oversight of OTC derivatives (CCP infrastructure)
Weaknesses in Basel rules will be considered from the perspective attributed by such rules to
capital and liquidity requirements.
B. Capital Requirements
6 See H Hannoun, „Towards a Global Financial Stability Framework” Bank for International Settlements
Publications page 9 of 26 <http://www.bis.org/speeches/sp100303.pdf>
9As highlighted in several papers,7 Basel II’s internal credit risk models8were not only
considered to be:
- Unduly risk sensitive, but also tended to generate pro cyclical effects. This was
illustrated during the Northern Rock Crisis.9 It has also been stated10 that Basel rules
focused on one type of risk – the risk that a bank would make too many bad loans and
lose so much money on those loans (such that its capital was wiped out). Whilst these
observations reflect the magnitude of attention dedicated to capital requirements, it
also highlights problems attributed to measurements in relation to such capital
requirements.
- They also generated pro cyclical effects. Pro cyclicality is a fundamental issue arising
from the implementation of Basel II capital requirements.
7 For example, see M Ojo, “Basel III and Responding to the Recent Financial Crisis: Progress made by the Basel
Committee in relation to the Need for Increased Bank Capital and Increased Quality of Loss Absorbing Capital”
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1680886 at page 3 of 15. “The introduction of Basel II resulted in changes being made
to the 1988 Basel Capital Accord to provide for a choice of three broad approaches to credit risk. This was
introduced into Basel II in view of the realization that the optimal balance may differ significantly across banks.
The increased focus on risk (and particularly credit risk), resulted from growing realization of the importance of
risk within the financial sector. The range of approaches to credit risk – as introduced under Basel II, and which
also exists for market risk, consists of the Standardised approach (which is the simplest of the three broad
approaches), the internal ratings based (IRB) foundational and advanced approaches.” See Basel Committee on
Banking Supervision, “Consultative Document, Standard Approach to Credit Risk, Supporting Document to the
New Basel Accord, January 2001 at page 1
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsca04.pdf and Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, “Consultative Document,
The Internal Ratings Based Approach Supporting Document to the New Basel Capital Accord” January 2001
Bank for International Settlements publications
<http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsca05.pdf>
8 Basel II’s internal credit risk models generated pro cyclical effects – given the fact that such models were
overly sensitive in their implementation for the calculation of regulatory capital (their implementation to
facilitate “the derivation of fundamental inputs for formulas which will determine the level of capital which
large banks must retain”).
9 “One of the underlying features of the recent Crisis was the build-up of excessive on and off-balance sheet
leverage in the banking system. In many cases, banks built up excessive leverage while still showing strong risk
based capital ratios. During the most severe part of the Crisis, the banking sector was forced by the market to
reduce its leverage in a manner that amplified downward pressure on asset prices, further exacerbating the
positive feedback loop between losses, declines in bank capital, and contraction in credit availability.” See Basel
Committee on Banking Supervision, “Basel III: A Global Regulatory Framework For More Resilient Banks and
Banking Systems” December 2010 at page 68 – 69 of 77 <http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs189.pdf>
10 T Congdon, “Northern Rock Shows Up Mess of Basel Rules” January 2008 <
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/markets/2783500/Northern-Rock-shows-up-mess-of-Baselrules.
html> (last visited 22 April 2012)
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Another vital distinction between Basel II and Basel III is evident from the fact that under
Basel III, systemically important banks will be required to have loss absorbing capacity
beyond the standards approved and announced on the 12th September 2010.11 Furthermore,
the Basel Committee and the Financial Stability Board (FSB) are “developing a well
integrated approach to systemically important financial institutions which could include a
combination of capital surcharges, contingent capital and bail in debt.”12
Total Regulatory Capital for systemically important banks is considered to be: [Tier One
Capital Ratio] + [Capital Conservation Buffer] + [Counter Cyclical Capital Buffer] + [Capital
for Systemically Important Banks]13
C. Liquidity Requirements
In highlighting why the relatively low focus attached to liquidity requirements constituted
another element of those weaknesses attributed to Basel rules, the importance of liquidity and
the role of banks in maturity transformations (ultimately triggering banking crises), has been
demonstrated in several respects.14
11 See Basel Committee for Banking Supervision, “Groups of Governors and Heads of Supervision Announce
Higher Global Minimum Capital Standards” 12 September 2010 at page 2 of 7
<http://www.bis.org/press/p100912.pdf?noframes=1>
12 ibid
13 For further information on capital conservation buffer and counter cyclical capital buffer, see section D of this
paper, “Basel III’s Efforts to address Capital and Liquidity Requirements”. See also Basel III Compliance
Professionals Association (BiiiCPA), “The Basel III Accord: Capital for Systemically
Important Banks Only” < http://www.basel-iii-accord.com>
14 For example, see Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, “Principles for Sound Liquidity Risk
Management and Supervision” September 2008 at page 1
<http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs144.htm>; As well as (banks) being regarded as highly leveraged
institutions which are considered to be “at the centre of the credit intermediation process”, functions related to
credit and maturity transformation are considered to be “vulnerable to liquidity runs and loss of confidence.”
See also S Walter, “Basel III: Stronger Banks and a More Resilient Financial System”
http://www.bis.org/speeches/sp110406.pdf at page 1 of 12
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The Liquid Coverage Ratio (LCR) which imposes a requirement that banks maintain an
adequate level of “unencumbered, high-quality liquid assets that can be converted to cash to
meet its liquidity needs for a 30 calendar day time horizon under severe liquidity stress
conditions specified by supervisors”15 and the Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR) Standard
which is designed to “promote longer-term funding of the assets and activities of banking
organizations by establishing a minimum acceptable amount of stable funding based on the
liquidity of an institution’s assets and activities over a one-year horizon”,16 it is argued,
should facilitate a diversification of liquid assets – hence discouraging a situation where they
could be accumulated and susceptible to exposures such as those relating to sovereign debts.
It will however, be highlighted in subsequent sections of the paper, that the two new Basel
liquidity standards, will probably not achieve their desired objectives where such standards
are not coupled with leverage ratios.
D. Basel III’s Efforts to address Capital and Liquidity Requirements
The incorporation of macro prudential elements into Basel III – in the form of capital buffers,
the new liquidity standards, and leverage ratios, can be regarded as efforts aimed at
addressing capital and liquidity requirements.
Capital Buffers: Such buffers are intended solely (as well as not exclusively) to address
problems attributed to pro cyclicality. They consist of:
15 See Basel Committee for Banking Supervision, “Consultative Document, International Framework for
Liquidity Risk Measurement, Standards and Monitoring” December 2009 at page 3 (11 of 44)
<http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs165.pdf>
16 ibid
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- Counter cyclical capital buffers17
- Capital conservation buffers
Counter cyclical capital buffers and capital conservation buffers constitute macro prudential
tools in the “time dimension”18 – such tools focusing on the need to mitigate pro-cyclical
effects.
Whilst counter cyclical capital buffers and capital conservation buffers are synonymous with
capital requirements, equivalent “buffers” which serve to address liquidity imbalances
comprise the two new liquidity standards, the Liquid Coverage Ratio (LCR) and the Net
Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR). Further, these new liquidity standards and the additional
minimum leverage ratio, it is argued, “could limit the build-up of financial imbalances during
the expansion phase of the financial cycle.
In particular, the additional leverage ratio provides an important back stop in cases where
excessive optimistic point-in-time risk measures tend to shrink risk weighted assets and
required cushions.”19
17 With counter cyclical capital buffers, “the build-up of the buffer is encouraged through restrictions on capital
distributions. Authorities would then release the buffer based on signs of strains, such as aggregate losses or
tighter credit terms. In both cases, the exercise of discretion still applies.” See Bank for International
Settlements, “Macro prudential Policy Tools and Frameworks: Update to G20 Finance Ministers and Central
Bank Governors.” at page 5
<http://www.bis.org/publ/othp13.pdf>
18 The first of two dimensions on which macro prudential policies aim to address system wide risk. The second
dimension is referred to as “the cross sectional dimension”. The “time-dimension” is defined as “the evolution
of system-wide risk over time” whilst the “cross sectional dimension” is defined as “the distribution of risk in
the financial system – at a given point in time”. See ibid at page 2
19 Ibid at page 6
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Leverage Ratios: The minimum leverage ratio and the new liquidity standards are
considered20 to have the potential to limit the build-up of financial imbalances during the
expansion phase of the financial cycle. Leverage ratios such as debt ratios (ratio of debt to
assets); debt-equity ratios, usually provide good indication of an entity’s means of financing.
Such ratios reflect whether such an entity is able to meet its obligations as it falls due. Hence
they also reflect how “liquid” a firm is. If the quality of debts issued by an entity is poor, then
the possibility of redeeming such may result in a situation where the company is left in a
vulnerable position (owing to level of losses incurred) – since it finds it difficult to meet its
obligations as they fall due. The impact of short term borrowing on maturity and liquidity has
been considered in various literature on the topic.21
Deleveraging is a process whereby an undertaking or financial intermediary attempts to
reduce its balance sheet, for example, by disposing of its assets.
Recent Basel III reforms will play a huge role in the level of deleveraging (by banks) - which
is presently occurring (and which is expected to take place in the subsequent months).
E. Macro prudential policies
A macro prudential policy is one which “uses primarily prudential tools to limit systemic or
system wide financial risk – thereby limiting the incidence of disruptions in the provision of
key financial services that can have serious consequences for the real economy by:
20 See S Walter, “Basel III: Stronger Banks and a More Resilient Financial System”
http://www.bis.org/speeches/sp110406.pdf at page 6 of 12
21“Deleveraging also puts additional downward pressure on financial markets.” Furthermore, consequences of
short term borrowing include “serious liquidity problems especially in the case of financial distress: the funding
of long term investments through short term debt widens maturity and liquidity gaps, making banks more
vulnerable to runs.” See N Papanikolaou and C Wolff, “Leverage and Risk in US Commercial Banking in the
Light of the Recent Financial Crisis.” March 2011 Draft
14
- Dampening the build-up of financial imbalances and building defences which contain
the speed and sharpness of subsequent downswings and their effects on the economy;
- Identifying and addressing common exposures, risk concentrations, linkages and
interdependencies that are sources of contagion and spill over risks that may
jeopardize the functioning of the system as a whole.”22
Pro cyclicality (as well as its impact), is usually attributed to the aggregational build-up of
system wide risks over time. Policies which exacerbate cyclical tendencies (for example
Basel II’s capital requirements)/cyclical effects which are exacerbated during peaks and
booms and which usually demonstrate the impact of aggregational effects of cyclical phases,
are referred to as being pro cyclical.23
F. Information gaps in Over-the Counter (OTC) derivative markets – ongoing
efforts by the Basel Committee to address these.
In view of the inter dependencies between systemic, liquidity risks, moral hazard,
transparency, information asymmetries and disclosure, ongoing efforts by the Committee to
address information gaps in OTC derivative markets cannot be regarded as surprising. Efforts
being undertaken by the Basel Committee, as well as other bodies such as the Financial
Stability Board, in focusing on a more system-wide based regulatory process involve the
implementation of “time dimension” and “cross sectional dimension” macro prudential
policies, as well as plans aimed at facilitating these policies. Such a macro prudential
22 See Bank for International Settlements, „Macro prudential Policy Tools and Frameworks: Update to G20
Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors” February 2011 at page 2 <
http://www.bis.org/publ/othp13.pdf>
23 „Leverage ratios serve a macro prudential response – in respect of the cyclical movement of leverage at the
system wide level. Leverage which tends to build up prior to crisis periods, is subsequently unwound when a
crisis occurs. This cyclical aspect exacerbates both the upswing phase and the downturn. In addition, what could
appear to be very low risk assets at the institutional level, can ultimately create incentives for the build-up of
risks at the broader system level.”
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approach will consequently result in greater extension of regulation to the securities markets.
Further, it will help facilitate the monitoring of vital and useful information such as market
wide asset prices and liquidity. Substantial work is currently taking place to address important
data gaps:24
Within the overall programme, priorities involve the provision of information on aspects
where the absence of good information has proved costly, and in particular:
i) The inter linkages between large, globally systemically important institutions
ii) Emerging concentrations of risk in terms of both exposures and funding
dependencies to certain institutions, countries and financial sectors;
iii) The transfer and ultimate holding of risk
iv) System wide leverage and maturity mismatches
G Sovereign Debts and Moral Hazard Attributed to Sovereign Debt Bailouts
During the recent Financial Crisis (as well as the 2010 and ongoing European Sovereign Debt
Crisis), several governments have had to raise their debt levels in order to stabilize their
economies. The principal problem attributed to sovereign debts, which is linked to their
characteristics,25 is the possibility of defaults occurring. Increased doubts in relation to the
24 See Bank for International Settlements, „Macro prudential Policy Tools and Frameworks: Update to G20
Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors” February 2011 at page 3 <http://www.bis.org/publ/othp13.pdf>
25Sovereign debts differ from private debts in view of the fact that:
- Collateral is rarely ever provided;
- No direct means exist to ensure the enforcement of the repayment of sovereign
debts
- No specified procedures exist in respect of a sovereign debtor who is unwilling to pay. See S Brandauer,
“Sovereign Debt and Economic Policies in Global Markets: A Political Economy Approach” (2006) –
particularly chapter on “Domestic Debt as a Commitment Device – A Probabilistic Voting Model of Sovereign
Debt” at page 20 http://edoc.ub.unimuenchen.
de/5082/1/Brandauer_Stefan.pdf (last visited 23 April 2012)
16
likelihood of larger sovereigns “rolling over maturing debt on their own”, as well as the
consequential occurrence of “very high, economically penalizing, interest rates”, is
considered to be the present reality.26
Another problem involves bailouts related to sovereign debts: Whilst bailouts are deemed
essential in facilitating financial stability, moral hazard, increased costs (particularly with
regards to high interest rates), attributed to such bailouts need to be addressed. Where
bailouts are eventually granted, distressed countries in need of such bailouts should be
assisted in completing the repayments relating to such bailouts (through the extension of
repayment periods or reduced interest rates) – rather than aggravating their position (hence
facilitating the risk of defaults).
Whilst bailouts, in certain instances, are necessary in order to facilitate financial stability,
such bailouts should occur as a means of last resort – after other initiatives and remedies have
been applied and sought. On March 12 2011, EU officials announced the following remedies
as a means of sustaining European sovereign debt markets: 27
- Doubling the lending capacity of the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF)28 from
220 billion Euros to 440 billion Euros;
26See N Economides and RC Smith, „Trichet Bonds To Resolve the European Sovereign Debt Problem“
January 2011 NET Institute at page 7 http://ssrn.com/abstract=1836743
27 See N Isaac, „EU Bailouts Fail to Keep European Sovereign Debt Markets Afloat“ April 2011
<http://www.elliottwave.com>
28 On the 9th May 2010, Europe’s Finance Ministers approved the creation of the European Financial Stability
Facility – which is aimed at preserving financial stability in Europe (through the provision of financial
assistance to Euro zone states during periods of economic difficulty). The objective of the EFSF being the
collection of funds and the provision of loans in conjunction with the IMF to address the financing needs of
Euro area member states in difficulty. Euro area member states are to provide guarantees for EFSF issuance of
up to a total of 440 billion euro on a pro rata basis. See G Calice, J Chen and J Williams, “Liquidity Interactions
in Credit Markets: An Analysis of the Euro zone Sovereign Debt Crisis> at page 1 of 41
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- Purchasing the sovereign debt of primary markets, as needed;
- Extending the repayment period for and lower than the interest rate charged on Greece’s
rescue loans.
It is not surprising that yields on the ten year Spanish, Greek and Portuguese bonds soared to
new records, following the announcement. Such reaction serves only to justify the assertion
that bailouts should not always be granted liberally without having consulted other measures.
Sovereign debts, as highlighted previously in the paper, given their nature, are more
susceptible to defaults than other forms of private debts. The possibilities of such defaults
occurring are further increased where bailouts are granted in relation to these debts.
According to Economides and Smith, the European authorities’ solution relating to the ECB’s
purchase of outstanding sovereign debt in the market (as of January 2011) had only
succeeded in buying a small amount of the distressed debt whilst pushing bond prices
upwards as a result of such intervention. They propose the creation of so called “Trichet
Bonds” which are intended to be ”new long duration bonds issued by countries in the EU area
that are to be collateralized by zero coupon bonds of the same duration issued by the ECB”.29
Advantages attributed to such “Trichet Bonds” are as follows:30
- Trichet Bonds Eliminate Uncertainties in respect of the Refinancing of Distressed
Countries’ Maturing Debt;
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1776425>
29 See N Economides and R C Smith, „Trichet Bonds to Resolve the European Sovereign Debt
Problem“ at page 2 <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1836743>
30 Ibid at pages 5 and 6
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- Trichet Bonds will be of much higher quality than present sovereign debt of distressed
countries;
- Trichet bonds will be liquid;
- Trichet bonds will require no bailouts and imply no moral hazard;
- Trichet Bonds provide debt relief for distressed economies;
- The exchange is voluntary and beneficial to both countries and debt holders.
Such Trichet bonds, indeed, would have provided a better alternative to the remedies
announced by EU officials on March 12, 2011. Had such Trichet bonds been considered as an
initial resort, and given the existence of appropriate and adequate incentives for countries
issuing such bonds, as well as debt holders to participate in the exchange process, they could
have served as better initial options than the subsequent European bailouts.
Any possibilities or likelihood of successfully implementing such Trichet bonds at present,
should be considered doubtful since no incentives would appear to exist – with respect to
distressed EU countries such as Greece, Spain, Ireland and Portugal, in issuing such bonds.
This is attributed to the fact that such countries having had a “better offer” in agreeing to the
March 12 2011 remedies, are likely to be more reluctant to purchase “zero coupon collateral
bonds” directly from the (European Central Bank) ECB. Apart from addressing whether such
countries are able to “apply some of (or any of) their reserves held by the ECB for this
purpose, or otherwise enter into an appropriate financing package with the ECB,”31 there
would appear to be less incentives for such countries to issue these Trichet bonds since they
31 Ibid at page 5
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have relatively long term obligations (ten year bonds) at present. For these reasons, such
possibilities of having provided a collateral with exchanged sovereign bonds (via the issue of
Trichet bonds by distressed European countries), have been significantly reduced. There is
now increased likelihood (with increased national deficits of certain distressed countries) that
defaults will occur.
II. Should sovereign debts be encouraged?
Since the ECB’s bond purchasing programme commences in May 2010, “all of the bonds
have been purchased on secondary markets rather than directly from governments. Further
the ECB holds 214 billion worth of Euros in euro zone government bonds.”
Increased costs32 of sovereign debts will not only discourage investors in purchasing such
debts (hence promoting a situation where higher yields occur) but would also increase
possibilities where some bond holders (investors) may have to share costs attributed to future
bailouts – with possibilities that taxpayers could even become involved in the cost sharing
process.
Sovereign debts should be encouraged: i) where such debts are required for the stabilization
of economies and; ii) where some form of collateral accompanies such debts.
32 - Booming deficits and the need to finance banking bailouts worth billions have turned sovereign bonds into
the new “junk debt market”. Investors are now paying $88,000 to insure $I million worth of debt issued by a
group of sovereign countries – or 88 basis points – more than the $83,000 paid to insure $1 million worth of
corporate debt. The growing problems of the Greek economy during 2010 resulted in the cost of its protection
against default rising to more than 400 basis points.” See E Moya, “Greece and the Rising Costs of Sovereign
Bonds” 29 January 2010
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2010/jan/29/greece-debt-eu-sovereign-bonds>
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III. Longer Term Refinancing Operations (LTROs)
The potential effects of the announcement of Longer Term Refinancing Operations in
December 2011, were initially undermined – however their generative effects, with particular
respect to the relationship between banks and governments, is becoming all the more
apparent.33 “The LTRO effect” is considered to be so powerful because it provided banks
with “a simple domestic trade that looked potentially lucrative.”
- The market is now re-evaluating the European Central Bank’s cheap three-year loans
of LTROs to banks. The ECB would lend banks money at 1 per cent which they could
then invest – particularly if they were Spanish or Italian – in far higher-yielding
domestic government debt. The banks not only obtained these in record amounts,
there was also clear evidence of international investors selling out to domestic
institutions. This has aroused great worry for many – particularly since (ultimately)
the market is only sustained by domestic banks which are running out of money –
which could even generate wider and wider spreads.”
Hence, Longer Term Refinancing Operations have also contributed towards triggering high
yields – domestic far higher yielding government debt. Hence they are considered by many to
have had little impact in easing the euro zone’s sovereign debt problems. Although they are
considered to provide a temporary solution, they do not address the sovereign debt problem.
The provision of LTROs by the ECB – rather than a resort to its bond buying programme, has
also raised suspicions about the effectiveness of, and belief in the bailout measures. However,
33 See R Milne, Financial Times, Friday 13 – 15 April 2012, page 21 Business Day,
www.businessdayonline.com
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whilst the liquidity assistance by both measures offers ease to the governments involved, it
also appears that the European Central Bank as well as domestic banks, will continue to
accumulate higher proportions of sovereign debt. The European Central Bank, with its
contentious bond buying programme has attempted to facilitate a situation whereby
governments are able to buy time – having the knowledge that both the bond buying
programme as well as the Longer Term Refinancing Operations might only serve as
temporary measures.
Indeed it has provided such measures in the hope that governments will be able to act with
the time purchased (through provision of emergency liquidity) in rectifying fiscal problems.
However, such expected returns (on the part of the government) do not appear to be
forthcoming and indeed, it is not very difficult to appreciate why governments faced with
austere fiscal measures, are able (in the face of such measures) to reduce present debt levels –
given a situation which only exacerbates and increases such debt levels.
The ensuing sections of the paper are aimed at highlighting measures which could be adopted
to address the sovereign debt crisis (whilst fostering economic development).
H. Role of New Basel Liquidity Standards in Mitigating Sovereign Debt Crises
It is argued that the new liquidity standards should help facilitate greater diversification of the
pool of liquid assets held by banks – contrary to the argument presented by those who are of
the opinion that the new liquidity standards will facilitate a situation where a concentration of
government debts are encouraged.34
34See S Walter, „Basel III: Stronger Banks and a More Resilient Financial System“
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According to the Basel Committee’s most recent impact study, “bank holdings of liquid assets
– which continue to be dominated by exposures to sovereigns, central banks and zero percent
risk weighted public sector entities, comprise 85% of banks’ liquid assets.”35
Having considered both new liquidity standards,36 it could be said that the second standard,
that is the Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR) Standard, is more likely to facilitate a situation
where assets are concentrated and susceptible to sovereign exposures. In any case, the crucial
issue relates to the need to address the liquidity needs of such banking entities – and
consideration of the fact that such standards did not exist previously – hence contributing to
the fuelling of systemic and liquidity risks which triggered the recent Financial Crisis.
Furthermore, the additional leverage ratios which are to be introduced37 by the Basel
Committee, should help in facilitating the diversification of liquid assets. The two new
standards, on their own, would probably not be able to effectively achieve the objective of
diversification of liquid assets.
http://www.bis.org/speeches/sp110406.pdf at page 4 of 12
35 ibid
36 “The first objective of the two standards is to promote the short-term resiliency of the liquidity risk profile of
institutions by ensuring that they have sufficient high quality liquid resources to survive an acute stress scenario
lasting for one month. The Committee developed the Liquidity Coverage Ratio to achieve this objective. The
second objective is to promote resiliency over longer term time horizons by creating additional incentives for
banks to fund their activities with more stable sources of funding on an ongoing structural basis.”
37 “The Basel Committee agreed to introduce a simple, transparent, non-risk based leverage ratio that is
calibrated to act as a credible supplementary measure to the risk based capital requirements. The leverage ratio
is intended to achieve the objectives of constraining the build-up of leverage in the banking sector, helping
avoid destabilizing deleveraging processes which can damage the broader financial system and the economy;
and reinforcing the risk based requirements with a simple non-risk based “back stop” measure.” See Basel
Committee on Banking Supervision, “Basel III: A Global Regulatory Framework for More Resilient Banks and
Banking Systems” at pages 68-69 of 77
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Leverage ratios will therefore play vital roles at the present time (and in the future) by:
- Helping to facilitate the diversification of assets – liquid assets in particular (and with
respect to the new liquidity standards); and
- Helping to avoid the present consequential effects of Basel III – where banks, in an
aim to achieve regulatory capital and leverage ratio requirements, are compelled into
a situation where aggressive de leverage occurs.
I How Can the New Basel Liquidity Standards be Implemented More Optimally to
Mitigate Sovereign Debt Crises?: Importance of Information Channels
Market Liquidity and Sovereign Debts: Monitoring of Information Channels\
- Manipulation of market liquidity is often the primary mechanism through which
speculative attacks are channelled and in this case, the object of interest is the bilateral
liquidity structure of the sovereign debt market and the sovereign CDS (Credit
Default Swap) market.”38 The role and impact of the manipulation of the CDS market
by speculative investors in exacerbating the liquidity dry up in the market for Greek,
Irish, Portuguese and Spanish sovereign debts, during the 2010 Euro Crisis, raised
concerns amongst several commentators.39
In this respect, greater focus on Pillar 3 of Basel II and the ever increasing need for greater
measures aimed at extending capital rules (as well as other regulatory measures) to the
securities markets, comes into play. If securities markets were not so lightly regulated as is
the case with banks, less opportunities would be presented to investors who are able to
38 See G Calice, J Chen and J Williams, “Liquidity Interactions in Credit Markets: An Analysis of the Euro zone
Sovereign Debt Crisis> at page 5 of 41 <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? abstract_id=1776425>
39 See ibid at page 2 of 41
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manipulate40 CDS markets. Measures aimed at facilitating greater enhanced disclosures
continue to play a vital role in facilitating market discipline. However, in order to reduce
incidences of “manipulation” by speculative investors, greater discretion in respect of the
timing and release of information to investors, will be required. Just as information plays a
crucial role in fuelling bank runs, it also plays a vital role in manipulation within the CDS
markets. Regulations which are able to address “short-term speculative short selling
practices” in respect of sovereign debts will be required within the CDS markets.
It has also been demonstrated that “whilst liquidity of the sovereign debt market dried up
over the Crisis period of 2010, the liquidity of the CDS market increase dramatically with
spread bids and spreads asked (offered) – approaching a one to one ratio.”
J. Greek Debt Re structuring Process and “Quantitative Easing” Measures
With a partial sovereign default having already taken place in Greece, it is considered highly
likely that further debt restructuring in other heavily indebted countries will occur – with
Ireland or Portugal being tipped to follow suit. This not only highlights the eventualities of
bailouts but also underlines why in the event of sovereign debt restructuring, further deeper
and more effective measures than merely the purchase of sovereign debts will be needed to
address ever accumulating levels of government debt.
The debt swap in Greece which took place during the first half 2012, the Private Sector
Involvement (PSI), the “largest debt restructuring in history”, was considered a success. The
40 “In particular, “naked” CDS positions were blamed for driving bond yields on Greek, Irish, Spanish and
Portuguese debt higher during the first half of 2010. Further, the manipulation of the CDS market by speculative
investors was considered to have played a vital role in facilitating the dry up in the market for such countries’
sovereign debts. See ibid
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completion of the bulk of the swap (which had been accepted by at least 97% of investors
around the 6th April 2012 – with May 15th being the latest deadline for the Greek government
to decide what to do with those bondholders who did not wish to participate in the PSI),
enabled Greece “to obtain a new EU/IMF bailout in March 2012 – which has helped to ease
market concerns over the euro zone crisis” – if even this was a temporary measure.41 “The
government is left with three options to confront those bondholders still resisting, namely:42
- Continue to service the bonds
- Default and trigger litigation
- Come up with a new offer while ensuring fair treatment for those who have already
accepted the swap.
Having obtained another bailout, with more bailouts or probably another LTRO on the way –
for those countries who have been granted bailouts and who are likely to undergo debt
restructuring soon, it appears likely that these countries will eventually default.43 Even more
likely if urgent measures and effective measures are not implemented to address their
sovereign debt problems.
Two measures, which in Skidelsky’s opinion might address these problems include:
i) Quantitative easing (printing of money on a heroic scale). He adds further that the
ECB should be empowered to buy any amount of Greek, Italian, Spanish, and
Portuguese government bonds required to drive their yield to near German levels.
This might stimulate real growth through several channels of which include: the
41 See The Punch, “Greece Extends Bond Swap Deadline Again” April 6 2012 at page 21.
42 ibid “Greece completed the bulk of its bond exchange on March 12 2012, swapping a nominal amount of 177
billion worth of Euros of domestic law government paper for new securities, inflicting real losses of about 74%
on private sector bondholders.”
43 “To make the PSI palatable, euro zone officials are offering incentives, including a 30 billion Euros worth
pool of cash. In addition to a cash payment worth 15 percent of the face value of their bond, each participant
will get a new Greek bond worth 31.5%. Those new bonds are far more secure since they will be issued under
English law, making it impossible for the Greek Parliament to force a default in future. They will also be treated
identically to bailout loans, meaning any future losses would have to be shared by euro zone governments.”
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reduction of lending rates, through raising the nominal value of public and private
assets, and through weakening the euro against the dollar and other currencies.”44
He however adds that the effects of quantitative easing on economic activity are uncertain
and that such an inflationary policy might trigger retaliation from Europe’s trading partners.
For this reason, he proposes:
ii) A combination of quantitative easing with public investment – which should
impart the growth impetus that the euro zone is urgently in need of – in order to
bring about a gradual reduction in its aggregate debt burden.”45
K. Conclusion
As highlighted in a previous paper, “the monitoring of useful data - such as market wide data
on asset prices and liquidity, institution related information such as credit default swap (CDS)
spreads and equity prices, additional institution-specific information related to the ability of
the institution to fund itself in various wholesale funding markets, and the price at which it
can do so, will be vital in obtaining a source of instantaneous data on potential liquidity
problems.”46
In relation to the “cross sectional dimensional aspect” of the Basel Committee’s macro
prudential policies, several provisions in Basel III should help to “address system risk and
44 R Skidelsky, “The Euro In a Shrinking Zone” Business Day, 19 December 2011
<www.businessdayonline.com>
45ibid
46 See M Ojo, „Preparing for Basel IV (Whilst Commending Basel III) – Why Liquidity Risks Still Present a
Challenge to Regulators in Prudential Supervision (II); and also Basel Committee on Banking Supervision,
“Basel III: A Global Regulatory Framework for More Resilient Banks and Banking Systems” at page 18 of 17
<http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs189.pdf>
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interconnectedness among (global) systemic institutions, by mitigating the risks arising from
firm-level “cross dimensional” approach exposures.
These include: higher capital requirements for trading and derivative activities, complex
securitizations and off balance sheet exposures, capital incentives for banks to use central
counter parties for OTC derivatives; liquidity requirements that better address funding risks
related to excessive reliance on wholesale short term funding.”47
Until intended leverage ratios are introduced and coupled with the new liquidity standards
[namely: the (Liquid Coverage Ratio) LCR and the Net stable Funding Ratio (NSFR)]; these
standards will probably not achieve half their desired effects – since liquid assets could be
accumulated under these standards, such as to an extent where they are susceptible to
sovereign exposures. This is one reason (amongst many),48 for concluding that whilst the
Basel Committee has gone a long way in addressing liquidity risks, its efforts still remain a
modest milestone in combating liquidity risks in prudential supervision.
In relation to the ECB’s efforts to provide temporary liquidity assistance – through measures
such as the Securities Markets Programme and LTROs, more effective measures aimed at
bringing about a reduction in overall debt levels, whilst stimulating economic growth, would
be required if defaults are to be avoided by countries with sovereign debt problems. At the
moment it appears more likely that bailouts will continue to be provided and that sovereign
debt levels will continue to rise – given tough and austere fiscal measures operating in
47 Bank for International Settlements, „Macro prudential Policy Tools and Frameworks: Update to G20 Finance
Ministers and Central Bank Governors” February 2011 at page 7 <
http://www.bis.org/publ/othp13.pdf>
48 Further challenges presented to Basel III include the restrictions imposed on it by the Dodd Frank Act – even
though the Act is similar to Basel III in several respects (for example, in respect of its requirements of more
stringent capital and liquidity standards, and a non risk leverage ratio).
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countries who have received bailouts. Given these circumstances, it becomes much easier to
appreciate why these countries are likely to default on their sovereign debt obligations.
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